Honoring Peter Jennings and Robin Wright
Recipients of the Edward Wiental Journalism Prize
Good evening.
It is an honor to participate in tonight’s recognition of the work of two extraordinary journalists, Peter Jennings and Robin Wright. It is rare today to find journalists who have both the interest and the rigor not only to explain complex foreign affairs to the American public, but also to convince us why we should care.
I’m told that Bob Gallucci [Dean of the School of Foreign Service] has a saying about the media that goes something like this:
“For the news media, good news, is bad news. Bad news, is good news. And complicated news, is no news at all.”
Using Dean Gallucci’s formulation, it seems to me that for too many of us, foreign news is by definition complicated news.
And that is a shame.
As Secretary of State Powell put it so eloquently at his confirmation hearing:
“There is no country in the world that does not touch us. We are a country of countries…we are attached by a thousand cords to the world at large – to its teeming cities, to its remotest regions, to its oldest civilizations, to its newest cries for freedom.”
So I applaud journalists like Peter and Robin. They are not intimidated by complicated stories. Their persistent efforts to keep foreign news on the front pages and on our evening broadcasts deserves reward, for it helps educate the public that, as Secretary Albright often said, U.S. leadership remains “indispensable” to global peace, security, and prosperity.
What does it mean for the United States to exercise leadership? It does not mean that we do everything ourselves or that we try to dictate solutions to every international problem. Our resources are not infinite.
Leadership also does not mean being “on call” to respond to every 911. We are not in the bi-polar world that dominated the decades of the Cold War when other countries were content to sit on the sidelines and wait for the United States or the Soviet Union to call the shots.
In the era of globalization, the Internet, and telecommunications, when we abrogate our leadership role, someone else will step in quickly to fill the void.
No less than here at home, global politics abhors a vacuum. If Secretary Albright is correct in her view that the U.S. is the one “indispensable” nation, we cannot afford to shirk our unique responsibilities as an international leader:
Leadership that provides a clear strategic vision of our basic national security interests;
Leadership that is reliable, and flows less from reaction to unpredictable events and more by our inner, moral compass that reflects enduring values;
Leadership that makes clear to friend and foe alike what our priorities are in a complex world;
With that in mind, I want to address a critical question about the nature of our foreign policy at this juncture in our history, the core issue of continuity versus change.
More than two months into the new administration, President Bush hasn’t told us much about his strategic vision. A steady stream of foreign leaders have been to town trying to get a read on the new administration.
Eventually, we’re going to figure out whether President Bush’s foreign policy will be marked by continuity or change, engagement or disinterest, coordination with allies or a tendency toward unilateralism, or, as seems likely, some combination of all of the above.
President Bush came to office without any significant foreign policy experience and understandably needs time to get his team in place and become more comfortable with the complex challenges facing our nation.
But no American President in the 21st Century can long ignore, or ever hope to escape, the web of interests which binds our future to that of the global community.
Nowhere is this truth more self-evident, and nowhere are the stakes higher, than on the Korean Peninsula. Secretary of State Powell said at his confirmation hearing that we would find, “much that is traditional and consistent,” about President Bush’s foreign policy. But already there are troubling indications that this Administration may abandon the path of engagement on the peninsula followed by President Clinton.
Any objective observer of the recent summit meeting between President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea and President Bush would have to conclude that we got off to a rough start.
It is dumbfounding to me how we could send our strategic ally – a Nobel Peace Prize winner – home to South Korea more confused about our intentions than when he arrived.
A day before the summit, Secretary of State Powell, sensibly, indicated that the Bush Administration would take up where Clinton left off in pursuing engagement with North Korea. The Clinton policy, the product of a year-long review by former Secretary of Defense William Perry, was making real progress in the months before Clinton left office. It enjoyed strong support from our allies South Korea and Japan, and had won bipartisan support in Congress.
Without warning, the very next day President Bush reversed Secretary Powell’s positive prediction, announcing that he had no intention of continuing negotiations with the North Koreans, claiming that they could not be trusted. The President cast doubts on North Korea’s adherence to the Agreed Framework, and said he would engage with North Korea “at a time and a place of our choosing.”
As I stated before, we do not have the luxury of engaging when and if we choose to engage. If we don’t, someone else will, and they may not share our interests. Indeed, in the absence of U.S. leadership, the Europeans have decided that perhaps they had better send a negotiating team to North Korea.
With all due respect to our European Allies, I don’t want them negotiating our security interests on the Korean Peninsula.
The Bush Administration cloaked its reluctance to engage North Korea now in tough language about the difficulties of verifying an agreement with North Korea. It is hardly a secret, however, that verification is one of the most difficult aspects of an agreement to nail down. But the difficulty of the challenge is not an excuse not to seek an agreement in the first place.
Had such fear paralyzed President Clinton, he would never have engaged North Korea and the Agreed Framework would never have been negotiated.
North Korea, in all likelihood, would now have enough fissile material to make dozens of nuclear bombs.
It is worth remembering just what the Agreed Framework has, and has not, accomplished.
In exchange for 500,000 tons per year of heavy fuel oil deliveries paid for by the United States and two light water reactors paid for by South Korea and Japan, North Korea agreed in 1994 to freeze its graphite moderated reactors and related facilities and eventually dismantle those reactors and facilities. The North further agreed that throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency would be permitted to monitor its facilities.
Moreover, the spent fuel from the reactors – enough to produce dozens of bombs if reprocessed – has been safely canned and put under round-the-clock IAEA supervision in preparation for its eventual removal from North Korea.
The cost of implementing the Agreed Framework probably will exceed $6 billion by the time the reactors are completed – perhaps even more. For us, it is a relative bargain: South Korea and Japan are paying for the reactors, which will account for roughly 90 percent of the total costs.
The Europeans, the Australians, and other friends are helping us meet the cost of the heavy fuel oil deliveries.
It’s a great example of how U.S. leadership and burden-sharing can go hand in hand.
So, with all the above in mind, permit me to be blunt: There is no evidence that North Korea has violated any of the essential elements of the Agreed Framework.
Without the Agreed Framework, North Korea would almost certainly have withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and begun to reprocess spent fuel from its reactors for use in nuclear bombs.
Without the Agreed Framework, there would be no IAEA inspectors on the ground in North Korea today.
Without the Agreed Framework, we would have faced the stark choice of bombing North Korea’s nuclear facilities or watching helplessly as they steadily built a nuclear arsenal.
Critics of the Agreed Framework point out that North Korea is not currently in full compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Specifically, they say North Korea has not permitted the IAEA to conduct the special inspections necessary to establish the past operating history of North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors.
That’s true. The critical compromise of the Agreed Framework can be found in Annex 3, paragraph 7, in which North Korea agrees to come into “full compliance” with its IAEA safeguards agreement, including allowing special inspections, when “a significant portion of the light water reactor project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components” of the reactors.
In other words, before they can turn on the reactors, they have to take all steps deemed necessary by the IAEA.
So North Korea is in compliance with the Agreed Framework, but not yet fully in compliance with its nuclear safeguards agreement.
Why is this detail important? Because it goes to the heart of the question about why this administration is reluctant to engage North Korea.
The President says it’s because North Korea can’t be trusted. And yet, six years into the Agreed Framework, North Korea has remained faithful to all the essential elements of the deal.
It’s no secret that many Europeans, and even some Americans, fear that the real impetus for President Bush’s decision to discard engagement with North Korea is a quasi-theological belief in the need for a U.S. national missile defense system.
If North Korea were to agree to curb its missile program, so this theory goes, it would profoundly undermine the rationale for NMD, or at least eliminate the urgency to deploy a system in the near term.
I hope these skeptics are wrong, and that the administration realizes it would be foolish not to explore whether North Korea is prepared to end its development and export of long range missiles in exchange for a more normal relationship with the United States.
The broad elements of a missile deal are pretty clear.
North Korea has reportedly offered to end its export and development of long range missiles in exchange for third country satellite launch services, financial compensation (which might include food aid or agricultural assistance), sanctions relief, and normal diplomatic relations with the United States.
As Dean Gallucci knows, the devil will be in the details. Verification procedures, limits on what kinds of satellites we might assist North Korea to launch, the form of any compensation – none of this will be easy.
But these difficulties argue for action, not inaction.
I think President Bush made a mistake when he told President Kim that he would not engage North Korea any time soon.
The reason he cited to justify his inaction – that he did not want to be “naive” about North Korea – risked, I thought, being interpreted as disrespectful to President Kim.
The President implicitly accused Kim – this 70 year old survivor of two assassination attempts and a long imprisonment…this statesman who has been living under North Korean artillery threat for 50 years – of being naive.
South Korea’s Sunshine Policy is many things. Naive it is not. It has nothing to do with trusting North Korea.
It is about pursuing security with hard-headed negotiations – and exposing the North to the changing world. As Justice Brandeis once wrote, “sunlight is the best disinfectant.” The Sunshine Policy is designed to push open the doors of the cloistered Korean state — and to test its commitment to peace while reducing tension on the peninsula. Neither we nor South Korea have given away anything in terms of our considerable deterrent posture.
I am beginning to worry that the Korea summit is just one example of a lack of strategic vision and an inclination toward unilateralism on the part of this administration.
Let me be clear. I’m not a fan of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. He runs a dictatorial communist state. But there is every indication that Kim Jong-il knows he has no alternative but to try to integrate North Korea with the world.
Many believe a verifiable missile deal with North Korea is impossible, choosing to place their faith in an unproven, strategically destabilizing, and hugely expensive national missile defense scheme.
And plenty of people in this town are opposed to any effort to engage North Korea. Before you accept the arguments of the nay-sayers, however, study the record.
• The nay-sayers argued that North Korea would never sign the Agreed Framework;
• The nay-sayers told us North Korea never would permit continuous International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring of its nuclear facilities;
• The nay-sayers were sure North Korea never would shut its reprocessing plant;
• The nay-sayers said North Korea never would let U.S. military personnel search for the remains of servicemen missing from the Korean War;
• The nay-sayers said North Korea never would permit inspections of a suspicious underground tunnel complex;
• The nay-sayers said North Korea never would adopt economic reforms, never permit monitoring of food aid deliveries, and never permit travel across the DMZ.
They were wrong on all counts.
Now, those opposed to testing North Korea’s commitment to peace are telling us that North Korea will never curtail its missile program. Well…guess what?
The only way they can be certain they won’t be wrong again is by never engaging North Korea in the first place.
Let’s not forget how much progress the Clinton Administration had made on the missile front. Indeed, if not for the uncertainty surrounding the outcome in Florida and the competing demands of the Middle East peace process, it is possible that Secretary Albright, or even President Clinton, might have been able to complete an agreement before leaving office.
Certainly President Kim of South Korea thought that an agreement was within reach. He repeatedly urged the President to travel to North Korea and close the deal.
It is unfortunate that President Bush so badly bungled the visit of President Kim to Washington.
As Tom Friedman noted in a recent column, for a President who pledged to repair alliance relationships, President Bush is not off to an auspicious start with key allies in Asia and Europe.
But it’s not too late. There is no need to arrive prematurely at any conclusion – especially given the poor track record of the prognosticators – before making an honest effort to determine if the carrot may work as well as the stick.
Perhaps we can make the world a little bit safer for future generations through the exercise of patient diplomacy, backed by deterrence.
But that will not happen until the President makes clear his strategic vision of our role and priorities in the world and enunciates clearly his view of our basic national security interests.
When he does that, I know we can count on journalists like Peter Jennings and Robin Wright to help us understand the implications: for ourselves, for our allies, and for generations of Americans and others to come.
Thank you, and good night.