Iraq: A way forward

President Bush does not have a strategy for victory in Iraq. The only strategy he has left is to prevent total defeat while he is in office. His intentions are to hand off the problem to his successor. Meanwhile, beautiful young men and women die every day. Why? For what cause? More and more Americans understandably want a rapid withdrawal, but such a rapid withdrawal would only mean that we have traded a dictator for total chaos and civil war and this chaos could become a regional war. These are the tragic and expensive results of a cowboy's narrow view of the world.

But there is a way that we can achieve the objectives that most Americans share: to bring the troops home, without leaving chaos behind. Joe Biden's idea is brilliant: To maintain a unified Iraq by 'federalizing' Iraq, and giving the Kurds, the Shiites and the Sunnis breathing room within their own regions. Under this plan, a central government would be responsible for common interests, like border security and the distribution of oil revenues. The plan would bind the Sunnis, who have no oil, by guaranteeing them a proportionate share of oil revenues. The plan would convene an international conference to secure support for the power/sharing arrangement and produce a regional non-aggression pact. It would call on the US military to withdraw most US troops from Iraq by the summer of 2008, with a residual force to keep Iraqis and their neighbors secure. It would increase economic aid, but tie it to the protection of everyone's rights and the creation of a jobs program. It would seek further funding from the oil-rich Gulf Arab states.

Today's reality is that Iraq is deep in growing sectarian violence between the Sunnis and the Shiites. In last December's elections, 90% of the votes went to sectarian lists. Ethnic militias are unceasingly the 'law', having infiltrated the official security forces. Sectarian cleansing has forced at least 250,000 Iraqis to flee their homes in recent months. As the same time, Al Qaeda is now so firmly entrenched in western Iraq that it has been reborn as an indigenous jihad threat. Because of this, Iraq now risks becoming what it was not before the war - a haven for fundamentalists.

There can be no purely military solution to the sectarian civil war. The only way to break the vicious cycle of violence and create the conditions for our armed forces to responsibly and safely withdraw is to give the Shiites, the Sunnis and the Kurds incentives to pursue their interests peacefully. That requires an equitable and viable power-sharing arrangement. Senator Biden's plan is not a partition. Quite the opposite, it may be the only way of preventing a violent partition and preserving a unified Iraq, with common interests like foreign policy and the distribution of oil revenues. The plan is consistent with Iraq's constitution, which provides for Iran's 18 provinces to join together in regions, with their individual security forces, and individual control of most day to day issues. The Biden plan is the only plan on the table for dealing with the militia, who will retreat to their own respective regions. The plan is also consistent with a strong central government, with clearly defined responsibilities and an agenda for that government.

The Biden plan mirrors the successful Bosnia plan, whereby that country was divided into ethnic federations, allowing Muslims, Croats and Serbs to retain separate armies. With the help of the United States, Bosnians have lived for a decade in peace. Now they are strengthening the central government and disbanding separate armies.

Joe Biden's plan is the best plan proposed to date:

1. Establish one Iraq, with three regions
2. Share the oil revenues
3. Enforce a regional non-aggression pact
4. Responsibly draw down US troops
5. Increase reconstruction assistance

At key times in the past, we have used our influence in Iraq to shape political outcomes. Now we must use our influence to produce a successful Iraq. With 170,000 young Americans at risk, we have both the right and the obligation to make our views known.

The Plan is not an invitation to sectarian cleansing. Since the Samara Mosque bombing in February 2007, a quarter million Iraqis have fled their homes for fear of sectarian violence, at a rate that presently approaches 10,000 people a week. This figure does not include the hundreds of thousands Iraqis who have left Iraq since the war began. Only a political settlement has a chance to stop this downward spiral.

This is a realistic, interim solution. Realistic, because none of the three major groups will give up their militia voluntarily. There is neither trust nor confidence. Yet, once federalism is implemented, the militias are likely to retreat to their respective regions to protect their own.

It is only an interim solution, as no nation can sustain itself forever with private armies. As has happened in Bosnia, however, over time these militia could be incorporated into regional and national forces. Following such a political settlement, the mixed populations could still be given a chance to live together peacefully, with protection for the minorities by an international peacekeeping force.

The Plan is in the self interest if Iran. The prospect of a civil war is not in Teheran's interest. Spilling over Iraq's borders, it could turn into a regional conflict with neighbors intervening on opposing sides, exacerbating the Sunni/Shiite divide. Any war in Iran could precipitate large refugee inflows, as Iraqis flee the fighting. Iraq has an interest in Iraq not splitting into independent states. Iran does not want to see an independent Kurdistan emerge, to serve as an example to its own five million Kurds. For these reasons alone, Iran could be persuaded to support a political settlement in Iraq.

The Plan is in the self interest of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. The Sunnis increasingly understand that they will not regain power in Iraq. Faced with the choice of being a permanent minority player in a central government dominated by Shiites, or having the freedom to control their own destinies in a Sunni region, they are likely to choose the latter, provided they are guaranteed a fair share of oil revenues to make their region viable. The Shiites know they can dominate Iraq politically, but not defeat a Sunni insurgency, which could bleed Iraq for years. The Kurds interest is to achieve as much autonomy as possible while keeping Iraq together. The price of peace will come in the shared oil revenues which in turn will attract the foreign investment needed to maximize Iraqi oil production. The result will be to give both the Shiites and the Kurds a piece of a much larger pie and to give all three the incentives to protect the oil infrastructure.